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The hypothesis that var(e) was constant across states
Griffiths, William, "Estimation of Actual Response Coefficients in the Hildreth-Houck Random Coefficient
would be rejected at the 0.05 level for the independent
Model," Journal of the American Statistical Association
agency sample using a likelihood ratio test. It would not
67 (Sept. 1972), 633-635.
be rejected at the 0.10 level for the direct writers.
Harrington, Scott, "Estimating the Impact of Prior Approval
For the independent agency insurers, bli ranged from
Regulation on Auto Insurance Rates," Working Paper
No. 84-3, Center for Research on Risk and Insurance,
- 0.008 to 0.149. The range for direct writers was 0.020
University of Pennsylvania, July 1984a.
to 0.049.14 The five states with the largest weighted, "The Impact of Rate Regulation on Prices and Unaverage (by premiums) bli s for the groups (in parenthederwriting Results in the Property-Liability Insurance
ses) were New Hampshire (0.111), New Jersey (0.068),
Industry: A Survey," Journal of Risk and Insurance 51
North Carolina (0.061), Rhode Island (0.059), and Maine
(Dec. 1984b), 577-623.
Ippolito, Richard, "The Effects of Price Regulation in the
(0.055). The five states with the smallest values were
Automobile Insurance Industry," Journal of Law and
Tennessee (0.007), Arkansas (0.013), New York (0.022),
Economics 22 (Apr. 1979), 55-89.
Nebraska (0.022), and Iowa (0.025). Research is needed
Joskow, Paul, "Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the
to explain this variation. It also would be desirable to
Property-Liability Insurance Industry," Bell Journal of
Economics and Management Science 4 (Autumn 1973),
estimate the effect of rate regulation on expected losses,
375-427.
to examine potential differences in its impact across
, "Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural
consumer groups, and to investigate nonprice responses
Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Reguto restrictive rate regulation in this market.
lation," Journal of Law and Economics 17 (Oct. 1974),
291-327.
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TYING REQUIREMENTS IN MARKETS WITH MANY SELLERS:
THE CONTACT LENS INDUSTRY

Deborah Haas-Wilson*
Abstract-The asymmetric information characterizing markets
strictions. The tying requirements and the commercial practice
for professional services has been used to justify tying require- restrictions, however, appear to have statistically insignificant
ments and other restrictions on the business practices of proeffects on quality.
fessionals. In this paper the prices and quality effects of state
restrictions that prohibit the fitting of contact lenses by indeWhile economists and the courts have focused on the
pendent opticians and thereby tie the sale of contact lenses to
questionable uses of tying requirements by sellers with
the services of ophthalmologists and optometrists are estimated. The results suggest that prices are significantly higher in market power in concentrated markets, questionable
markets with tying requirements, controlling for differences in
tying requirements are also observed in markets with
quality and variations in other state commercial practice re-

Received for publication December 12, 1985. Revision
accepted for publication July 15, 1986.
* Smith College.

many sellers. For example, a recent Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulation prohibited funeral directors
from tying the sale of caskets to the purchase of crema-

tion services.' A 1978 FTC regulation prohibited oph-

I would like to thank Mark Aldrich, Randy Bartlett, Roger
Kaufman, and the anonymous referees for helpful comments.
Also I would like to thank the U.S. Federal Trade Commission 1 Funeral Industry Practices, Trade Regulation Rule. 49 Fed.
for providing part of the data base.
Reg. 3, 564 (1984).
Copyright ?) 1987
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thalmologists
and
optometri
addition,
the FTC did not
control for variations in
to purchase their eyeglasses from the same provider who

conducted their eye examination.2 The FTC is also
investigating state prohibitions on denturism, the practice of dental laboratory technicians selling dentures
directly to the public without the involvement of a

dentist. State prohibitions on denturism effectively tie
the sale of dentures to the services provided by dentists
(Kushman, 1983). In each of these cases, tying requirements are found in industries with many sellers. Yet in
each of these industries sellers have some degree of
market power as a result of licensing laws and imperfect
consumer information.

This paper examines the effect of tying requirements
on the prices and qualities of goods and services offered
by sellers with some degree of market power in relatively unconcentrated markets. Accordingly, the analysis incorporates elements from the traditional commod-

ity bundling literature which analyzes the use of tying
requirements to increase the profits of monopolists
(Bowman, 1957; Stigler, 1968; Adams and Yellen, 1976;

and Schmalensee, 1982) and the more recent literature
which analyzes the use of tying requirements by sellers
in unconcentrated markets (Craswell, 1982). In particular, this paper presents an econometric study of the
economic impact of state restrictions that prohibit the
fitting of contact lenses by opticians, and thereby tie the

sale of contact lenses to the services of ophthalmologists
and optometrists.

Current regulatory policy toward opticians' scope of
practice is based on the assumption that the market

fails because (1) consumers are faced with the dilemma
of selecting an ophthalmologist, optometrist, or optician
without the benefit of full information on the quality of
services provided and (2) opticians, in particular, may
exploit this asymmetric information by providing lower
quality services. This assumption has led to the in-

ference that restricting opticians' ability to independently fit contact lenses is necessary to protect consumers from their own purchase decisions and from
unfair seller behavior.

Although there is theoretical support for the argument that imperfect consumer information will result in

demand, production costs, state commercial practice
restrictions, or state licensing requirements.

I. Tying Requirements in the Market for
Contact Lenses

The traditional antitrust objection to tying requirements, the requirement that the purchaser of one prod-

uct, the tying product, purchase a second, tied product
from the same seller, is based on the assumption that
sellers with market power in the tying good market will
use tie-in sales to exclude competitors in the tied good
market and thereby extend their market power into the
tied good market. Economists, however, have questioned this "leverage" theory of tie-in sales. If the tying

and tied goods are consumed jointly and in fixed proportions, then an increase in the price of the tied good
will, ceteris paribus, decrease demand for the tied and

the tying good. Rather, economists have suggested that
monopolists may use tying requirements to increase

profits through price discrimination (Bowman, 1957) or

through strategies of pure and mixed bundling (Stigler,
1968, Adams and Yellen, 1976, and Schmalensee, 1982).
Tying requirements may have an exclusionary effect,

however, if the tying and tied goods are complements
and consumed in variable proportions (Bowman, 1957),

the sale of the tied product for use with the tying
product represents a substantial share of all sales of the

tied product (Posner, 1976), or the purpose of the tying
requirement is to protect the reputation of the seller of

the tying good (Posner, 1976). Sellers may engage in
tying to protect their reputations when consumers can
evaluate the performance of the bundle but not the

performance of the tying and tied good separately.
Thus, the reputation of the tying good seller is not hurt
by the use of low quality tied goods (Craswell, 1982).
This discussion suggests that the evaluation of the
legality of tying requirements in the market for contact
lenses should include an assessment of the effect of the

tying requirement on both price and quality.

The purchase of contact lenses is a three step process.
First, the consumer must go to an ophthalmologist or

market failure (Akerlof, 1970), an FTC study (1983)
optometrist to obtain a refractive eye examination and
concluded that the difference between the quality of
contact lens perscription. Opticians are not allowed to
contact lens fittings by ophthalmologists, optometrists,
prescribe contact lenses. Then the potential contact lens
and opticians is not statistically significant. This result
consumer requires a keratometric or fitting examination
suggests that state restrictions on contact lens fittings by
to measure the radius of curvature of the cornea. Fiopticians may not be necessary to protect consumers.
nally the lenses must be purchased and their fit
The FTC, however, did not include tying requirements
evaluated.
in their empirical analysis and thus did not test the
In twenty-two states tying requirements between the
effect of tying requirements on price or quality. In
refractive eye examination or contact lens prescription

and the contact lenses are imposed indirectly by laws
which
prohibit the fitting of contact lenses by indepen2Advertising of Ophthalmic Goods and Services, Trade Regdent opticians (opticians practicing independently from
ulation Rule, 43 Fed. Reg. 23, 992 (1978).
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relative to N. The implicit price of sellers' time will vary
these states3 prohibit the fitting of contact lenses by any
by seller type due to differences in ophthalmologists',
optician. In sixteen states4 the laws permit optioptometrists', and opticians' investments in education
cians to fit contact lenses, but only under the superviand abilities to realize economies of scale and scope.
sion of ophthalmologists and optometrists. In Alabama,
Sellers' conjectural variations with respect to price
Florida, and the District of Columbia opticians may
will depend on the extent to which competitors' abilities
dispense contact lenses, but only with a prescription
to compete are constrained. Sellers practicing in states
with restrictions on the business practices of optomthat includes both refractive test information and
post-refractive eye measurements.
etrists (REG and R-AD) and opticians (R-FIT) may
optometrists or ophthalmologists). The laws in four of

believe dp1/dpj is closer to zero. REG includes restricII. The Model and Empirical Results

tions on (1) the use of trade names, (2) the employment
of optometrists by lay persons or corporations, (3) the

Following a symmetric oligopoly model developed by
Cubbin (1974) and extended by Waterson (1984), sellers
producing a heterogeneous product are assumed to
maximize profits with respect to price. Thus, each seller

number of branch offices an optometrist may operate,
and (4) locating offices in mercantile locations. R-FIT

and R-AD are state restrictions on contact lens fittings
by opticians and advertising, respectively.

will have a profit function:

E and ej depend on the level of consumer informa-

tion which in turn depends on the number of sellers
Flj = p, q - C, ( q, ) j = 1, 2, ... ., N (1)
(Pauly and Satterthwaite, 1981) and the level of advertising (Nelson, 1974). The level of advertising chosen by
where qj = fj ( P1 P2' ... I PN)- Accordingly, ophthalmic
supplierj sets price to satisfy:
supplierj is assumed to be a function of Pj and QUAL-

Pj = C' [1 - (1/(aE + (1 - a)ej)) (2)

ITYj (Nelson, 1974 and Kihlstrom and Riordan, 1984),

supplier type,5 and R-AD:

where

Aj = gj(Pj, QUALITYJ, FIT-OPTYPEJ,

[YiJ (dpi1dpj)( aqj1api)]
a Y-i * j ay qjaQ pi

EX-OPTYPEJ, R-AD). (3)

The number of ophthalmic suppliers depends on
market profitability or demand, measured as Y
Pj is a function of supplierj's marginal costs Cj, the
(Newhouse, Williams, Schwartz, Bennett, 1982), state
weighted average of sellers' conjectural variations with
licensure
requirements (Benham, Maurizi, and Reder,
respect to price a, the market elasticity of demand
1968), and the regulatory environment (Meltzer, Langwhen dp1/dpj 1, E, and sellerj's elasticity of demand
well, Keane, and Nelson, 1983):

when dp1/dpj 0, ej.
N = b(Y, REG, R-AD, R-FIT, LIC). (4)
The determinants of Cj' are the prices of inputs

(INPUT), the implicit price of sellerj's own time, and

State restrictions on the business practices of optomthe type of contact lenses supplied (SOFT). The imetrists may deter entry by optometrists. And as displicit price of a seller's time depends on the number of
cussed earlier, R-FIT may have an exclusionary effect
hours worked and seller type-whether the seller who
on opticians. Further it is expected that fewer opticians
fit the contact lenses is an ophthalmologist, optometrist,
will locate in the twenty-one states that require their

or optician (FIT-OPTYPEj) and whether the seller who
licensure (LIC).

provided the refractive eye exam is an ophthalmologist

Equations (2) through (4) can be solved implicitly for

or optometrist (EX-OPTYPEj). As a seller works longer
1' as a function of the variables-n which Cj', a, E, ej,
hours, the value of his/her time increases. Hours worked
Aj, and N depend:
will depend on both the quality of services provided

(QUALITYJ) and demand for services (measured as per Pj = hj(QUALITYJ, R-FIT, REG, R-AD,
capita income Y) relative to the number of sellers (N).
Assuming higher quality lens fittings require more labor

time, marginal costs will increase as quality increases.
Assuming sellers work longer hours when demand increases, marginal costs will increase as Y increases

LIC, FIT-OPTYPE1, EX-OPTYPEj,
SOFTJ, INPUT, Y). (5)

To test the effect of state contact l
tions on the quality of contact lens f
version of the FTC's (1983) regression model is esti-

mated. The FTC's model included (1) contact lens
3 Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Vermont.
4Alaska, California, Colorado, Deleware, Florida, Hawaii,
Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada, New York, Oregon,

5Approximately 74% of opticians, 45% of optometrists, and
32% of ophthalmologists choose to advertise. 20/20 Magazine

South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

(Nov./Dec. 1985), p. 86.
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wearer
characteristics
TABLE 1.-2SLS REGRESSIONS ON PRICE that
(standard errors
in parentheses)a
(WEARER),
such
as
age,
sex
FTC
exam,
and
average
ho
PRICE ln( PRICE)
characteristics
that
may
i
CONSTANT
167.30f 7.07f
such
as
type,
cleanliness,
d
(43.29)
(1.65)
the
type
of
supplier
who
fi
SOFT 53.92 0.31
The
FTC's
quality
model
is
(6.48) (0.04)
package
price
of 17.87d
the 0.10
contac
FITOPH
assumed
to
choose
price
and
(10.84)
(0.07)
FITOPTOM 2.72 0.00
FTC's model is expanded to include a measure of the
(13.93) (0.09)
difficulty of fitting contact lenses for a particular conEXOPH 28.48e 0.15d
sumer (FAIL), and the four state regulatory variables:

QUA LITYJ = aj ( WEARERj, LENSj,

FIT-OPTYPEj, Pj, FAILj,
R-FIT, R-AD, LIC, REG). (6)

yb

(13.77) (0.09)

-0.01

INPUT

-18.52

QUALWC

R-FIT

-0.24

(0.00) (0.20)

-0.19

(39.06) (0.24)

-0.64 0.00
(0.88) (0.01)
17.29e 0.08d

FAIL equals one if the consumer tried to wear contact
(7.85) (0.05)
lenses before, but was unsuccessful, and zero otherwise.
LIC
-4.45
0.02
As the degree of difficulty of fitting the contact lenses
(7.33) (0.05)
R-A
D 22.89d 0.10
increases, quality of the contact lens fitting may
de(13.29) (0.08)
crease. State commercial practice restrictions and licens-

REG

ing requirements may increase the level of quality.6

QUA LITYJ and Pj are endogenous. Accordingly, the
effects of state tying requirements on quality and price

are estimated using two stage least squares regression
(2SLS).

9.141

0.04e

(3.07) (0.02)
N= 354 N= 354

R2= 0.29 R2 = 0.26
F = 12.73 F = 10.98

a Estimated standard errors adjusted as suggested

The FTC data include the price and quality of 239.
the
b Ln( Y) for the log-linear regression.
contact lenses provided by a sample of 354 ophthalmolPredicted values.
ogists, optometrists, and opticians between 1976 and
d Significant at the 10% level of significance.
' Significant at the 5% level of significance.
1979 in 18 urban areas. Quality is measured as an index
f Significant at the 1% level of significance.
of the contact lens wearer's eye health or the relative
presence of seven potentially pathological eye conditions caused by poorly fitted contact lenses. Price is
measured as the adjusted package price of the eye
at the 5% and the 10% levels of significance, respecexamination, keratometric examination, and the contact tively. The results suggest that contact lens prices are
lenses.7 These data are described in more detail in FTCapproximately $17.30 or 8% higher in states with the

(Dec. 1983).

contact lens fitting restriction. With respect to the rela-

The Empirical Results

tionship between price and quality, the results suggest
that quality, measured as eye health, does not have a
statistically significant effect on price.

The results of regressions that test the effect of state Restrictions on the commercial-practices of optomtying requirements on contact lens prices, controllingetrists are also associated with higher contact lens prices,
for differences in quality are reported in table 1.8 Usingcontrolling for quality differences in both regressions.
the linear and log-linear form the null hypothesis thatThis is consistent with an earlier study that found
the coefficient on R-FIT is equal to zero can be rejectedeyeglass prices are higher in states with commercial

practice restrictions (Haas-Wilson, 1986). State licens-

ing requirements for opticians and the advertising

6 Federal Trade Commission (Sept. 1980).
however, have statistically insignificant
7"The contact lens package price charged to each restriction,
subject

effects of
on contact lens prices. Earlier studies found that
was deflated by a cost of living index derived from a Bureau
Labor Statistics survey of family budgets for 39 cities.eyeglass
Indices prices were higher in states with advertising
were keyed to both the city of fit and year of fit." FTC, Dec.

restrictions (Benham, 1972; Feldman and Begun, 1978).
The difference may be due to the fact that the earlier
8The reported regressions use QUALW as the measure of fit
studies did not control for the presence of other comquality. Estimation of equation (5) using QUA LU gives similar
results.
mercial practice restrictions.
1983, at C-3.
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TABLE 2.-2SLS REGRESSION ON QUALITY
(standard errors in parentheses) a
QUALW QUALU

(1983) finding. Finally, the results suggest that advertising restrictions, commercial practice restrictions, and

opticians' licensing requirements have statistically insignificant effects on quality.

CONSTANT

8.02 2.04
(9.08) (3.45)
FITOPH
3.39
1.17
(2.68) (1.02)
FITOPTOM - 0.06 0.11
(2.01) (0.77)

pb

-

0.08

-0.03

(0.07) (0.03)
SEX
A

3.61-

GE

FA
WEA

(1.57) (0.60)

-

IL

0.07

-

- 0.03
(0.07) (0.03)
2.83 -1.04

RTIME

HOURS
DIRT

-

-

1.23

(1.91) (0.73)

tively tie the sale of contact lenses to eye examinations
by prohibiting opticians from independently fitting con-

(0.47) (0.18)

nation with the finding that state contact lens fitting

0.83c

-

-

0.29c
0.56

and variations in other state restrictions. This in combirestrictions have a statistically insignificant effect on

quality suggests that the restrictions are benefiting providers rather than consumers of contact lenses.

(1.09) (0.41)

REFERENCES

(4.10) (1.56)
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R-FIT

-0.10

2.71c
-0.18

(1.46) (0.55)

0.06
-0.48
(2.30) (0.87)
0.53
-0.19

(1.31) (0.50)
REG

The results suggest that state restrictions which effec-

tact lenses increase the total price of contact lenses by

7.85

-

study of the effects of tying requirements and commercial practice restrictions in the market for contact lenses.

approximately 8%, controlling for differences in quality

SOFT

LIC

restrictions in the market for eyeglasses, this is the first

-0.31e

1.65c

D

While a large body of empirical evidence exists on the
effects of advertising and other commercial practice

(0.29) (0.11)

-0.83e

(1.03) (0.39)
DAMAGE 1.03 0.38
(0.87) (0.33)
WA RP 0.07 -0.17

R-A

Conclusions

0.53
-0.01
(0.67) (0.26)

N= 354 N= 354

R2 = 0.14 R2 = 0.14
F= 3.51 F= 3.29
Estimated standard errors adjusted as suggested by Maddala (1977) at
239.

b Predicted values.
Significant at the 10% level of significance.

d Significant at the 5% level of significance.
Significant at the 1% level of significance.
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Equation (6) is estimated in linear form using two
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(QUALU).9 The results in table 2 suggest that state

and Opticians (Dec. 1983).

Effects of Restrictions on Advertising and Commercial
Practice in the Professions: The Case of Optometry (Sept.
1980).
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SHEEPSKIN EFFECTS IN THE RETURNS TO EDUCATION

Thomas Hungerford and Gary Solon*
Abstract-Some previous discussions have dismissed screening
theories of education partly on the ground that diploma years
of education do not confer especially large earnings gains.
Similarly, most empirical research on earnings functions has
assumed an absence of "sheepskin" effects. We report evidence, however, of substantial and statistically significant
sheepskin effects. Although this suggests that the previous
dismissals of the screening hypothesis were premature, our
evidence of sheepskin effects is amenable to nonscreening
interpretations also.

According to screening theories of education, individ-

uals with more schooling tend to earn more not because
(or, at least, not solely because) schooling makes them
more productive, but rather because it credentiates them
as more productive. A frequently cited article by Layard
and Psacharopoulos (1974), however, dismissed the importance of the screening hypothesis on the grounds
that several of its refutable predictions were not sup-

ported by available evidence. One of these was the
"sheepskin" prediction that "wages will rise faster with
extra years of education when the extra year also conveys a certificate." After surveying a number of studies,

Layard and Psacharopoulous (henceforth LP) concluded that "rates of return to dropouts are as high as

to those who complete a course, which refutes the
sheepskin version of the screening hypothesis."
Since publication of the LP paper, an undergraduate

labor economics textbook' has cited LP's analysis of
sheepskin effects as "telling criticism" of the screening

hypothesis. A prominent proponent of the screening
hypothesis, Riley (1979), has accepted LP's summary of

the empirical evidence, but responded that some versions of the screening hypothesis do not imply sheep-

skin effects. In the meantime, the ongoing flood of
empirical research on earnings functions typically has

continued to treat the natural logarithm of the wage
rate as a linear (or occasionally quadratic) function of
years of education, with no allowance for discontinuities in diploma years.2
The estimated rates of return used by LP were based

on data that did not disaggregate dropouts' earnings by
how many years of school they had completed. LP

acknowledged, "We would have preferred to show the
earnings gain associated with each year of the course,
including the year when it was successfully completed."
This note presents a reanalysis of sheepskin effects
based on the type of data LP wished they had. The
results contain very strong evidence of sheepskin effects
after all. The next section describes our analysis, and

the following section summarizes and discusses our
results.
Empirical Analysis

Our analysis is based on May 1978 Current Population Survey data on white male nonagricultural wage
and salary workers between the ages of 25 and 64. The
uncommonly large sample size in this data set (16,498
observations) enables relatively precise estimation of
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nonlinear returns to education.
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1 Addison and Siebert (1979, p. 139).

2 There have been occasional exceptions, however, such as
Goodman (1979), Mohan (1981), Olneck (1979), and Weiss
(1984).
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